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ABSTRACT
In this study we measure multiple dimensions of product market competition
and examine their impacts on corporate governance disclosure, based on a sam-
ple of UK public firms over the period 2001 to 2009. We use factor analysis to
explore the different dimensions of product market competition; and regression
models to analyse the association between multiple dimensions of product mar-
ket competition and corporate governance disclosure. We find that firms in less
competitive industries have significantly more corporate governance disclosure.
Furthermore, we detect a positive association between corporate governance
disclosure and board independence, as well as audit committee independence.
This suggests that firms with better corporate governance tend to disclose more
information to external investors. Overall the findings support the view that
managers use more corporate governance disclosure as a substitute for the
external disciplinary force of product market competition.
1. INTRODUCTION
WE INVESTIGATE the association between product market competition andcorporate governance disclosure.  Our research question is motivatedby the different predictions in the theoretical literature. On the one
hand, Darrough and Stoughton (1990) investigate competition in the context
of an entry game, and predict that firms in more competitive industries will
adopt better disclosure practice. This is because withholding information can
be interpreted by potential entrants as good news, thus encouraging competi-
tors to enter the market. On the other hand, Gertner et al (1988) detect that
firms in more competitive industries will have less disclosure. Here, the logic
is that information disclosed by one firm can be used opportunistically by
industry rivals, and hence it is optimal for firms to have less information dis-
closure. In a similar vein, Wagenhofer (1990) suggests that greater product
market competition inhibits disclosure in markets with mature competitors.
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Empirical studies in this area also present mixed results. For example,
Harris (1998) finds that a firm's decision to provide separate segment disclo-
sure is positively related to the level of competition. In contrast, Verrecchia
and Weber (2006) report that the probability of a firm providing proprietary
information is negatively related to product market competition, measured by
industry concentration. Based on a survey of UK private firms, Dedman and
Lennox (2009) suggest that when managers perceive more competition, they
are more likely to withhold information on sales and costs. Healy and Palepu
(2001) conclude that the empirical studies provide little evidence on how
product market competition is related to disclosure. To summarise, disagree-
ments over the association between product market competition and disclo-
sure remain unresolved and we aim to investigate this issue within corporate
governance disclosure in a sample of UK public firms.
In the current study, we suggest that product market competition can
potentially have two opposing effects on corporate governance disclosure. One
reason for this is that firms might have more disclosure as a result of intense
product market competition, since competition serves as a disciplinary and
monitoring mechanism, to pressure managers to commit to better disclosure
practice. Alternatively, corporate governance disclosure can be seen as a sub-
stitute for product market competition: managers use more disclosure in less
competitive markets to maintain investors' confidence in their firms.
Under the Companies Act 1967, UK public firms are mandated to dis-
close audited financial statements to shareholders. In 1993, the Accounting
Standard Board (ASB) introduced voluntary ‘Operating and Financial
Review'’(OFR) for public firms. OFR recommends public firms in the UK pro-
vide a formalised narrative explanation of their financial performance, con-
taining information on corporate social responsibility and internal governance,
as such information is useful for investors to interpret firms' financial per-
formance. Furthermore, UK public firms have low entry barriers for most
industries (except for those under tight government regulation). Therefore, we
exploit the UK setting to analyse the relationship between product market
competition and corporate governance disclosure.
In previous empirical studies, competition is constructed typically as an
industry level measure. For example, the level of concentration is used to meas-
ure competition (see for example, Marciukaityte and Park 2009; Balakrishnan
and Cohen 2009). However, other studies suggest that product market compe-
tition has different dimensions (see for example, Raith 2003). Following the
approach of Li (2010), we employ different measures, to reflect product market
competition at the industry level, and examine their impact on the corporate
governance disclosure. We report that firms in less competitive industries
(where entry cost is high and market size is large) have significantly more dis-
closure compared with their counterparts in more competitive industries.
Our results are robust after controlling for those firm-specific charac-
teristics and corporate governance factors that have been documented to
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affect disclosure, in previous studies. Furthermore, we find a positive associ-
ation between corporate governance disclosure and both board independence
and audit committee independence. This suggests that firms with better cor-
porate governance disclose more information to external investors. Overall, the
findings support the argument that managers use more corporate governance
disclosure as a substitute for the external disciplinary force of competition.
Accordingly, this paper contributes to the literature in a number of
ways. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to measure multiple
dimensions of product market competition, and to investigate the relationship
between corporate governance disclosure and competition in the UK context.
We add to the previous literature by identifying competition as an important
economic determinant of a firm's decision to disclose more information.
Second, we provide evidence on the positive association between corporate
governance factors and disclosure. Finally, we extend earlier studies (e.g.,
Marciukaityte and Park 2009), that use industry concentration to measure
competition, and find that different dimensions of competition can have dif-
ferent impacts on disclosure.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the lit-
erature and develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and research
method. Section 4 presents the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
2. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE. DISCLOSURE AND PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION:
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
In this Section we start with a discussion of corporate governance disclosure,
then we develop our hypotheses.
2.1 Corporate governance disclosure and product market competition in the UK
context
Historically, the Companies Act of 1900 (UK) required companies to disclose a
limited amount of audited balance sheet information to their shareholders. A
revised version in 1907 made it mandatory for public firms to file balance
sheets with a central registry at Companies House (Flower 2004). In 1918, the
Wrenbury Committee considered potential reforms of the Companies Act and
recommended that the policy of limited public disclosure should continue. In
1925, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales took a
similar stance. In 1967, private companies were required to start filing their
accounts with Companies House (Flower 2004).
In 1993, the Accounting Standard Board issued the statement of
'Operating and Financial Review' (OFR). The OFR enabled UK public firms to
provide a structured narrative explanation of their financial performance,
which has been voluntary (mandatory) for all listed firms before (after) April 1,
2005. However, on November 28, 2005 the UK government announced that
the OFR would no longer be mandatory. In 2006, the Accounting Standard
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Board recommended a revised version of the OFR, which can be seen as an
extended version. According to the Accounting Standard Board, the revised
OFR should be 'addressed to members, setting out their analysis of business
with a forward-looking orientation in order to assist members to assess the
strategies adopted by the entity and the potential for those strategies to suc-
ceed; the OFR should focus on matters that are relevant to the interest of
members' (the Accounting Standard Board, 2006: principle 6). The OFR,
which is qualitative in nature, contains information on corporate social
responsibility and internal governance, as such information is valuable for
investors to interpret the financial performance of public firms.
Furthermore, public firms in the UK, similar to their US counterparts,
have a diverse corporate ownership structure and high quality disclosure.
Apart from those tightly regulated industries (such as utilities), entry barriers
are generally low for other industries in the UK. This indicates that there is a
sufficient variation in the level of competition from industry to industry.
Consequently, we take advantage of this interesting institutional setting in the
UK to explore the relationship between product market competition and cor-
porate governance disclosure.
2.2 Theoretical framework
The classical agency problem arises from the information asymmetry and the
conflict of interests between principles (shareholders) and agents (managers).
The separation between ownership and control provides managers with the
opportunity to make decisions that maximise their benefits, at the expense of
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983).
Information asymmetry between managers and shareholders leads to ineffi-
cient resource allocation, which subsequently increases the cost of raising
capital because shareholders demand a risk premium for their investments.
Prior literature suggests that product market competition is an efficient mon-
itoring and disciplining mechanism to alleviate agency problems, as Shleifer
and Vishny (1997, p. 738) assert: ‘Product market competition is probably the
most powerful force towards economic efficiency in the world’.
Previous studies show that product market competition provides incen-
tives for managers to better align their interests with those of shareholders. It
is well established in the literature that firms with strong governance have on
average better performance (see for example, Gompers et al 2003; Anderson et
al 2004). However, Giroud and Mueller (2011) find that firms with good cor-
porate governance have higher firm value and better operating performance,
in non-competitive industries, suggesting that firms in non-competitive indus-
tries will benefit more from strong governance practices. This implies that
competition serves as an effective mechanism to discipline managers and thus
partially substitutes internal governance tools.
Another theoretical perspective that is pertinent to the relationship
between competition and disclosure is a manager's career concern (Narayanan
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1985). Narayanan observes that top executives have an incentive to take
actions that boost short-term performance at the expense of long-run share-
holders’ interests, if they are concerned with their reputation on the labour
market, and that such concerns could become more serious when product
market competition is high. Other studies show that CEO turnover is higher
in more competitive industries (see for example, DeFond and Park 1999), and
poorly performing firms in competitive industries are more likely to become
takeover targets (Kruse and Rennie 2006). In contrast, managers in less com-
petitive industries tend to suffer less from such career concern problems.
However, information asymmetry still exists in the presence of intensive com-
petition (albeit to a less extent), and disclosure can be used partially to solve
the information asymmetry problem.
2.3 Hypotheses development
Product market competition plays an instrumental role in determining firms'
disclosure practice. On the one hand, firms can strengthen disclosure to
enhance corporate transparency and improve their reputation among
investors. On the other hand, if the information disclosed is opportunistically
exploited by current or potential competitors, such disclosure could put firms
at risk. This suggests that firms tend to adopt a low level of disclosure
(Verrecchia 1983). Thus, firms have to balance the benefits and costs of dis-
closure to decide the optimal level of such disclosure. We further elaborate two
potential channels through which product market competition can affect a
manager's incentives on corporate governance disclosure.
First, managers in less competitive industries are more likely to suffer
from agency conflicts, as they are operating in an environment where the dis-
ciplinary force of competition is largely absent. In order to substitute the weak
monitoring function of competition and signal to the market that their inter-
ests are aligned with those of shareholders, managers in less competitive
industries can volunteer to make more disclosure, to build a good reputation
and occupy advantageous positions in the labour market. This 'substitution
argument' is based on the assumption that firms in less competitive industries
have access to more free cash flows from operations, as a result of dominant
market power. Hence, managers are likely to benefit themselves with corpo-
rate resources in the absence of a strong monitoring environment. To alleviate
the concerns of shareholders and maintain investors' confidence in their
firms, managers in less competitive industries are motivated to disclose more
information on corporate governance. As such, managers can use disclosure
as a substitute for the disciplinary force of competition.
Although theoretical work (see for example, Clarke 1983) predicts that
it could be sub-optimal for firms in less competitive industries to increase dis-
closure on sales and investment strategies, we suggest that corporate gover-
nance disclosure can bring more benefits than costs, for the following reasons.
First, corporate governance disclosure does not involve specific information on
Economic Issues, Vol. 19, Part 1, 2014
- 77 -
a product or investment decision, so competitors are less likely to benefit from
such information. Second, a high level of disclosure on corporate governance
signals that firms are committed to high transparency, which is generally
appreciated by investors. Based on the above discussion we expect to find
support for the following hypothesis:
H1: Firms operating in less competitive industries disclose more information on
corporate governance.
However, Guadalupe and Peres-Gonzalez (2005) find evidence that the private
benefits of managerial control, as a measure of the magnitude of conflict
between managers and shareholders, decrease with the intensity of product
market competition. Relating product market competition to quality of finan-
cial reporting, Marciukaityte and Park (2009) detect that firms in more com-
petitive industries are less likely to engage in earnings management. In a sim-
ilar vein, Balakrishnan and Cohen (2009) find that competition disciplines
managers because the frequencies of earnings re-statement are significantly
lower in more competitive industries. Focusing on the relationship between
product market competition and a firm's social performance, Fernandez-Kranz
and Santalo (2010) report that firms in more competitive industries have bet-
ter social ratings. These results indicate that shareholders of firms in more
competitive industries are more likely to have fewer agency conflicts.
Previous literature also suggests that more disclosure is able to reduce
information asymmetry and alleviate agency problems (see for example, Easley
and O'Hara 2004; Lambert et al 2007). Furthermore, La Porta et al (2006) find
that an increase in mandatory disclosure is associated with a substantially
lower level of private benefits of control. Therefore, managers in more compet-
itive industries might voluntarily commit to better corporate governance dis-
closure. Here, competition can be seen as a powerful disciplinary mechanism
for managers, since competition effectively removes incapable managers and
managers who do not act in the best interest of shareholders. Furthermore,
firms operating in highly competitive industries are more likely to rely on
external financing for growth, ceteris paribus, because competition (in gener-
al) will lower the profit margin at the industry level. Previous literature sug-
gests that a major benefit of increased disclosure to reduce information asym-
metry and lower cost of capital (see for example, Easley and O'Hara 2004;
Lambert et al 2007). Consequently, as firms in competitive industries also
compete for funds in the financial market, they have strong incentives to dis-
close more information on corporate governance to raise capital at lower costs.
Hence we posit that:
H2: Firms operating in more competitive industries disclose more information on
corporate governance.
Prior studies suggest that internal corporate governance can be of great sig-
nificance in monitoring firms' performance and minimising managers' oppor-
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tunistic behaviours. For example, Bujaki and McConomy (2002) report that
firms with more ‘unrelated directors on the board’ voluntarily provide more
information related to corporate governance. Ben-Amar and Boujenoui (2010)
also find that ‘the percentage of unrelated directors on the board’ impacts gov-
ernance disclosure. Wang and Hussainey (2013) show that corporate gover-
nance features (board size and composition, CEO duality, directors' owner-
ship) influence companies' decision to disclose forward-looking statements
voluntarily in the narrative section of annual reports, from a sample of UK
public firms.
The findings of these studies suggest that board independence (meas-
ured by the percentage of independent directors on the board) plays an impor-
tant role in increasing board strength and monitoring of managers. This is
because insider directors are more likely to have a close relationship with the
management, which lowers their incentive and effectiveness in monitoring the
top executives (see for example, Pincus et al 1989). Accordingly, we hypothe-
sise that there is a positive relationship between independent directors and
corporate governance disclosure. In addition, audit committee independence
can enhance the quality of disclosure, as they are more able to question the
financial reports and to provide better links with external auditors.
Accordingly, we predict a positive association between audit committee inde-
pendence and the disclosure of information related to corporate governance.
Thus we hypothesise that:
H3: Firms with more independent board and audit committee disclose more
information on corporate governance.
3. RESEARCH DESIGN
In this section we first discuss the data used in the current study. Then we
provide more details on the source of data and research method adopted in the
study.
3.1. Data on product market competition
Raith (2003) suggests that product market competition has multiple dimen-
sions, so drawing a conclusion based on one dimension of competition could
be misleading. Following the literature (such as, Karuna 2007; Li 2010), in
this study we construct variables to measure three dimensions of competition:
potential entry cost to an industry, industry profitability and industry con-
centration. Specifically, we use industry capital expenditure (the average cap-
ital expenditure for all firms in one industry) and industry market size (loga-
rithm of aggregate industry sales) to reflect entry cost. This is because indus-
try capital expenditure reflects the necessary investment for potential rivals to
compete with existing players in an industry, so it is positively correlated with
entry costs. As large sales is normally associated with high initial investment,
the correlation between industry market size and entry costs should also be
positive.
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Next, we use industry price-cost margin and industry return on assets
(ROA) to measure industry profitability, as large profits can motivate firms to
enter an industry. It is necessary to control for industry profitability in the
analysis. High industry profitability might imply more competition from poten-
tial entrants, or less competition from existing players in the industry
(because existing players can achieve high profit, so they have less incentives
to increase competition), and hence the interrelationship between industry
profitability and competition is ambiguous. Finally, we use the four firm con-
centration ratio and Herfindahl index to capture industry concentration, as
highly concentrated industries are assumed to have less competition.
We further employ principal component analysis with Oblimin rotation,
to generate three factors with eigenvalue larger than one: Entry cost is a fac-
tor obtained from the factor analysis on industry capital expenditure and
industry market size; industry profitability is a factor obtained from the factor
analysis on industry price-cost margin and industry ROA; whilst industry con-
centration is a factor obtained from the factor analysis on the four firm con-
centration ratio and Herfindahl index. All the data used to calculate competi-
tion measures are collected from DataStream for all the firms listed in each
industry. In the analysis we first use each individual measure for competition
and then use three factors simultaneously in the regression, to generate a
complete overview of the association between the dimensions of competition
and corporate governance disclosure. It is worth mentioning that for industry
classification, we employ the 4 digit SIC codes available in DataStream.
Finally, consistent with previous studies, we exclude financial firms.
3.2 Data on corporate governance disclosure and firm-specific characteristics
Our initial sample is based on FTSE 250 companies over the period 2001 to
2009. After excluding financial and utilities firms, the final sample consists of
162 firms.  We use the corporate governance rating score of the Corporate
Governance Quotient database developed by Institutional Shareholder
Services (ISS), that rates publicly traded companies in terms of the quality of
their corporate governance. The information is voluntarily disclosed by the
firm, which reflects their disclosure levels of internal governance information.
The information about corporate governance variables such as board inde-
pendence and audit independence, is hand-collected from firms' annual
reports. Firm level financial information is obtained from DataStream.
3.3 Research method
In order to investigate the effect of competition and internal corporate gover-
nance on governance disclosure, we employ panel data analysis. Our main
interest is to examine the relationship between competition and corporate gov-
ernance disclosure. Previous studies show that firm size is important in
explaining the level of disclosure (Zarzeski 1996; Chen and Jaggi 2000; Cheng
and Courtenay 2006), so we control for firm size (natural logarithm of total
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assets) in our analysis. Both theoretical and empirical studies in industry
organisations suggest that leverage reduces the intensity of competition
(Fudenburg and Tirole 1986; Chevalier 1995), so we include leverage (long-
term debt to total assets) as another control variable. Firms with a high growth
rate and greater risk are less likely to disclose information (Rogers and
Stocken 2005; Waymire 1985), so we include market-to-book ratio, cash flow
(ratio of cash flow to total assets) and the firm's historical beta (a measure of
a firm's systematic risk, obtained from DataStream) in our models. We also
control for institutional ownership, since these investors can obtain more
information directly from their meetings with managers and hence there is
less need for disclosure (Schadewitz and Blevins 1998; Celik et al 2006). 
We first estimate the determinants of firms' corporate governance dis-
closure (INDEXCGQ) without controlling for the industry effect. Next, follow-
ing Fernandez-Kranz and Santalo (2010), we re-estimate the model by adding
industry effects. It is worth noting that we have examined issues related to
endogeneity in our models. According to the Hausman Test there is no strong
significant evidence of an endogeneity problem among the industry variables
we are employing. We also used lagged variables to double check the robust-
ness of our results. Those findings are not significantly different from what is
reported in this paper. Our random effects model is as follows:
INDEXCGQit = β0 + β1Xit + β2Control + εit
Where INDEXCGQit is our corporate governance disclosure for firm i at year t,
with α as an intercept term; Xit is a vector of product market competition
measures and Control is a vector of control variables. εit is the error term.
Variable definitions are provided in Table 1.
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(1)
AUDIND is the percentage of independent directors in the audit committee
BETA is historical beta of firms
BOARDIND is board independence, which is measured as the ratio of inde-
pendent directors to total number of directors on board
CASHFLOW is defined as ratio of cash flow to total assets
ICAPEXP is measured as the weighted average of capital expenditures for
firms in each industry per year
INDCON4 is the four firm concentration ratio, which is measured as the sum
of the market share of four biggest firms in each industry each year
INDEXCGQ is corporate governance disclosure measure
INDHHI is defined as the Herfindahl index, which is measured as the sum
squared of market share of firms in each industry each year cont...
Table 1: Variable Definition
4. RESULTS
This section is divided into two sub-sections. Firstly, we discuss the descrip-
tive statistics and report findings from the correlation analysis of the investi-
gated variables. Secondly, we discuss the results of the regression analysis on
the relationship between competition and corporate governance on corporate
governance disclosure.
4.1. Descriptive statistics and correlation
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables. The mean of the
corporate governance disclosure score is 86.79, indicating that the average
firms in the sample have a relatively good ranking of disclosure. The mean of
the four firm concentration ratio is 0.625 which suggests that, on average,
firms operate in a relatively concentrated industry (the largest four firms in the
industrial control 62.5 per cent of market share). The mean of firm size (loga-
rithm of total assets) is 13.36, as our sample is populated with large firms
included in the FTSE250 index. The mean of board independence (audit com-
mittee independence) is 0.48 (0.96), indicating that 48 per cent (96 per cent)
of board members (audit committee directors) are independent. Finally, on
average 17.49 per cent of shares are owned by institutions. 
Table 3 shows the correlations between variables. Corporate gover-
nance disclosure is positively correlated with firm size, board independence
and audit committee independence, suggesting that large firms, and firms
with independent boards and independent audit committees, are more likely
to disclose more information on corporate governance. The industry-average
of capital expenditure is positively related to price-cost margin at the industry
level and the industry return on assets, indicating that profitable industries
tend to have high entry costs in terms of capital investment. The industry-
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...cont
INDMGN is the price-cost margin measured as industry sales to industry
operating costs
INDMKTS is assessed as the product market size which is the natural loga-
rithm of industry sales in each industry yearly
INDROA is defined as industry Earnings Before Interest, Taxes and
Depreciation (EBITDA) to industry total assets
INSIDEROWN is the percentage of shares owned by insiders
INSTITUTIONOWN is the percentage of shares owned by institutions
LEV is leverage which is measured as the ratio of long term debt to total assets
MKBV is market to book ratio
SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets
average of capital expenditure is also positively correlated with the four firm
concentration ratio, indicating that relatively concentrated industries have
high entry costs.
Industry market size is positively correlated with price-cost margin and
industry return on assets, which implies that industries with large market size
are more profitable. Price-cost margin at the industry level (industry return on
assets) is positively correlated with the four firm concentration ratio and
Herfindahl index, indicating that highly concentrated industries are more
profitable. This is consistent with findings in the economics literature (see for
example, Rivera-Batiz 1988), as powerful firms in less competitive industries
are price makers instead of price takers, so they can charge high prices to
increase their profits. The four firm concentration ratio is highly correlated
with the Herfindahl index, as they both measure the level of industry concen-
tration.
Industry return on assets is positively related to insider ownership,
suggesting that insiders are more likely to invest in firms operating in prof-
itable industries. The correlation between board independence (audit commit-
tee independence) and firm size is positive, as large firms are likely to have
more independent boards (audit committee). Leverage is negatively related to
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INDEXCGQ
ICAPEXP
INDMKTS
INDMGN
INDROA
INDCON4
INDHHI
SIZE
MKBV
LEV
BOARDIND
CASHFLOW
AUDIND
BETA
INSIDEROWN (%)
86.788
385155.5
18.253
0.015
0.963
0.625
0.178
13.364
2.847
0.171
0.480
0.188
0.959
1.058
17.485
0
46894
16.730
1.93e-06
-0.711
0.239
0.049
9.919
-99.6
0
0.1
-6.676
0.286
-0.54
0.01
100
986944.2
19.951
0.065
7.690
1
1
18.212
21.25
0.647
0.818
0.980
1
5.35
73.4
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum
cash flow, which indicates that firms with less cash flow use higher gearing to
finance their operations. Finally, board independence is negatively correlated
with institutional ownership, hence institutions invest less in firms with inde-
pendent boards, possibly due to concerns of the board that firms become less
transparent when institutions hold a significant percentage of shares.
According to Table 2, the correlations between variables are low to moderate,
which implies that multicollinearity is not of a concern in our specification.
4.2. Results on the association between competition and corporate governance
disclosure
Table 4 presents our main results on the association between product market
competition and corporate governance disclosure, without controlling for the
industry effects. In Models 1 to 6, the dependent variable is the corporate gov-
ernance disclosure index, while the independent variable of central interest is
each individual measure of competition. In Model 7 the dependent variable is
still the corporate governance disclosure index, while the independent vari-
ables are three factors resulting from the principal component analysis (entry
cost, industry profitability and industry concentration, respectively). In each
model we control for firm-specific characteristics and corporate governance
variables. The coefficients of industry average capital expenditure (ICAPEXP,
Model 1), industry market size (INDMKTS, Model 2) and industry price-cost
margin (INDMGN, Model 3) are positive and significant, which suggest that
firms operating in industries with higher entry costs (higher capital expendi-
ture and large market size) tend to disclose more information on corporate
governance. Furthermore, firms in more profitable industries tend to have
more corporate governance disclosure.
In Model 7 the coefficient of entry cost (which is the factor score
obtained from the principal component analysis on industry capital expendi-
ture and industry market size) is positive and significant, which confirms our
earlier result that firms disclose more governance information in less compet-
itive industries where there is higher entry cost. Our findings are consistent
with Li (2010), who shows that competition from potential rivals increases
management earnings forecasts and management investment forecasts.4
Overall, our findings support the argument that firms use more corporate gov-
ernance disclosure as a substitute for the external disciplinary force of prod-
uct market competition, as managers in these firms aim to gain a reputation
for the good treatment of their shareholders and the maintenance of investors'
confidence in their firms. H1 is thus supported.
Our results also suggest that the association between competition and
corporate governance disclosure is sensitive to the multi-dimensional charac-
terisation of competition, as we find a positive and significant association
between entry cost (industry profitability) and disclosure, but an insignifi-
cant association between industry concentration and disclosure. Therefore,
we caution against the use of a concentration ratio as the only measure of 
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Dependent variable:
Indexcgq
Independent
Variables:
ICAPEXP
INDMKTS
INDMGN
INDROA
INDCON4
INDHHI
Entry cost
Industry profitability
Ind’y concentration
BOARDIND
AUDIND
INSIDEROWN (%)
SIZE
MKBV
LEV
CASHFLOW
BETA
Constant
Observation
Wald Chi2
R2
(1)           (2)           (3)             (4)            (5)           (6)            (7)
Table 4: The association between product market competition and corporate governance disclosure
without controlling for industry effects (for the 162 firms (clusters))
0.001**
(0.033)
14.142**
(0.038)
11.341*
(0.072)
0.011
(0.796)
2.276**
(0.012)
0.827**
(0.003)
0.552
(0.909)
-5.938**
(0.045)
0.626
(0.486)
31.367**
(0.023)
353
38.06***
(0.000)
0.131
2.775**
(0.030)
11.985*
(0.077)
11.058*
(0.080)
0.012
(0.777)
2.679**
(0.003)
0.793**
(0.004)
1.117
(0.818)
-5.278*
(0.074)
0.549
(0.543)
-20.792
(0.464)
353
37.87***
(0.000)
0.129
109.972*
(0.094)
12.117*
(0.075)
10.884*
(0.085)
0.019
(0.668)
2.631**
(0.004)
0.766**
(0.006)
1.208
(0.804)
-5.349*
(0.071)
0.694
(0.442)
29.117**
(0.039)
353
35.78***
(0.000)
0.126
-0.005
(0.993)
11.819*
(0.088)
11.350*
(0.074)
0.0226
(0.601)
2.466**
(0.007)
0.734**
(0.008)
1.268
(0.795)
-5.264*
(0.077)
0.729
(0.436)
33.060**
(0.018)
353
32.66***
(0.000)
0.119
-0.751
(0.821)
11.593*
(0.093)
11.420*
(0.073)
0.0229
(0.597)
2.487**
(0.007)
0.736**
(0.008)
1.356
(0.782)
-5.136*
(0.090)
0.759
(0.408)
33.162**
(0.018)
353
32.66***
(0.000)
0.119
-0.736
(0.910)
11.745*
(0.087)
11.386*
(0.073)
0.0227
(0.600)
2.474**
(0.007)
0.735**
(0.008)
1.293
(0.791)
-5.213*
(0.083)
0.735
(0.419)
33.031**
(0.018)
353
32.65***
(0.000)
0.119
2.144**
(0.026)
-0.453
(0.691)
-0.283
(0.792)
13.103*
(0.056)
11.301*
(0.074)
0.006
(0.884)
2.438**
(0.008)
0.856**
(0.002)
0.549
(0.911)
-5.662*
(0.063)
0.636
(0.484)
32.163**
(0.023)
353
40.02***
(0.000)
0.136
***, **,* significant at 1 %, 5 %, 10 % levels respectively. 
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Table 5: The association between product market competition and corporate governance 
disclosure after controlling for industry effects (for the 162 firms (clusters))
Dependent Variable:
Indexcgq
Independent vari-
ables:
ICAPEXP
INDMKTS
INDMGN
INDROA
INDCON4
INDHHI
Entry cost
Industry profitability
Ind’y concentration
BOARDIND
AUDIND
INSTITUTIONOWN (%)
SIZE
MKBV
LEV
CASHFLOW
BETA
Constant
Wald Chi2
R2
(1)           (2)           (3)             (4)            (5)           (6)            (7)
0.001**
(0.038)1
1.864*
(0.102)
11.180*
(0.081)
0.013
(0.760)
2.481**
(0.009)
0.896**
(0.002)
0.431
(0.932)
-6.010*
(0.059)
0.981
(0.321)
23.240
(0.126)
40.01**
(0.001)
0.141
6.549
(0.857)
13.084*
(0.071)
12.321*
(0.056)
0.026
(0.550)
2.606**
(0.006)
0.714**
(0.012)
0.383
(0.939)
-5.050*
(0.107)
0.844
(0.393)
28.398*
(0.091)
36.35**
(0.003)
0.131
-35.288
(0.178)
13.526*
(0.064)
11.078*
(0.086)
0.021
(0.639)
2.586**
(0.007)
0.758**
(0.008)
0.439
(0.931)
-5.210*
(0.100)
0.901
(0.365)
62.357**
(0.029)
36.92**
(0.002)
0.134
-0.485
(0.582)
12.995*
(0.074)
11.860*
(0.066)
0.024
(0.584)
2.624**
(0.006)
0.720**
(0.011)
0.161
(0.975)
-5.091*
(0.107)
0.929
(0.355)
31.483**
(0.040)
35.66**
(0.003)
0.132
204.105
(0.132)
11.800*
(0.107)
11.156*
(0.083)
0.017
(0.701)
2.606**
(0.007)
0.828**
(0.005)
0.125
(0.980)
-5.734*
(0.073)
0.952
(0.339)
25.931*
(0.088)
37.34**
(0.002)
0.134
4.141*
(0.062)
11.751*
(0.108)
11.335*
(0.077)
0.010
(0.828)
2.576**
(0.007)
0.863**
(0.003)
0.231
(0.964)
-5.860*
(0.067)
0.764
(0.441)
-46.776
(0.283)
38.63**
(0.001)
0.134
3.018**
(0.033)
-0.845
(0.640)
1.707
(0.800)
11.629
(0.111)
11.482*
(0.074)
0.008
(0.849)
2.443**
(0.010)
0.921**
(0.002)
0.181
(0.971)
-6.237*
(0.049)
0.917
(0.354)
27.751*
(0.082)
41.43**
(0.001)
0.140
***, **,* significant at 1 %, 5 %, 10 % levels respectively. 
competition (see for example, Marciukaityte and Park 2009), because the sub-
sequent inference could be misleading.
The coefficients on board independence and audit committee independence
are positive and significant across all the regressions, which indicate that
firms with independent boards and independent audit committees have better
corporate governance disclosure. This is consistent with previous findings of a
positive relationship between governance and disclosure (see for example,
Anderson et al 2004). Accordingly, the empirical evidence supports H3.
Regarding the firm-specific variables, we show that there is a positive rela-
tionship between corporate governance disclosure and both firm size and mar-
ket to book ratio. In addition, cash flow is negatively associated with corporate
governance disclosure.
We re-estimate the regressions after controlling for industry effects, and
report the findings in Table 5. The results are qualitatively consistent, as the
coefficients of ICAPEXP (Model 1), INDMKTS (Model 2), INDMGN (Model 3) and
entry costs (Model 7) remain positive and significant, which suggests that our
results stay robust after controlling for the industry effects.
Finally, we estimate the models using the lagged corporate governance
factors to control for any possible endogeneity. The results (not reported) were
not substantially different from the results reported in this paper.5
Our results have important implications for regulators and policy mak-
ers, as government policies to regulate product market competition may have
unintended consequences on firms' disclosure practices. For example, the
multiple dimensions of competition imply that regulators need to consider
both current level of competition in terms of industry concentration and the
potential level of competition in terms of entry barriers, to assess appropriate-
ly the overall level of competition across different industries.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this study we test the association between product market competition and
corporate governance disclosure, using a sample of UK firms. What distin-
guishes the current study from previous studies on competition and corporate
disclosure is that we use multiple measures (entry cost, industry concentra-
tion and industry profitability), to reflect the different dimensions of competi-
tion, and analyse the association between each competition dimension and
corporate governance disclosure. We find that firms in less competitive indus-
tries (where entry cost is high and market size is large) have significantly more
disclosure. The results remain robust after controlling for the firm-specific fac-
tors and corporate governance variables that have been documented to affect
disclosure. Furthermore, we report a positive association between disclosure
and board independence, as well as audit committee independence, which
suggests that firms with better corporate governance tend to disclose more
information to external investors. Overall, the findings support the argument
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that managers use more disclosure as a substitute for the external discipli-
nary force of product market competition.
We contribute to the literature by identifying competition as an impor-
tant determinant of corporate governance disclosure. As far as we are aware
of, this is the first study to measure multiple dimensions of product market
competition, and investigate the relationship between corporate governance
disclosure and competition in the UK context. Second, we provide new evi-
dence on the positive association between corporate governance factors and
disclosure. Finally, our findings confirm that the association between compe-
tition and corporate governance disclosure is sensitive to the multi-dimen-
sional characterisation of competition. Therefore, we suggest that in future
studies, product market competition needs to be measured by more than
merely industry concentration to avoid reaching misleading inferences.
Our findings may have implications for both academics and policy mak-
ers, as we provide empirical evidence that different dimensions of competition
affect a firm's decision to disclose more information. In addition, firms with
strong internal governance (such as having more independent directors on the
board) are likely to disclose more information. Hence, our results suggest that
regulators might harmonise industry policies and accounting regulations to
increase social welfare of the general public. Furthermore, the multiple dimen-
sions of competition imply that policy makers may consider different aspects
of competition before they assess the impact of important merger and acqui-
sition deals that could re-shape the level of competition within an industry.
Our study is subject to the following limitations. First, we adopt an industry
level competition measure based on data from publicly listed firms in the UK.
As we do not have access to data on UK private firms, our measure is likely to
underestimate the actual level of competition. Second, our competition meas-
ure is compiled based on UK domestic firms. As the result of economic inte-
gration within the European Union (EU), companies from other EU countries
may compete directly with domestic UK firms, so our competition measure is
likely to be downward biased. Finally, by construction, our competition meas-
ure is at an industry level, however firms operating in the same industry may
confront different levels of competition. Unfortunately this is not captured by
our competition measure.
We suggest three directions for future research. First, researchers may
go beyond a single country to investigate the association between competition
and corporate governance disclosure from economically integrated regions,
such as the EU, in particular countries that use a common currency, such as
the euro. Within the EU, firms from different countries compete directly with
each other, which suggests that competition at the EU level may have an
impact on firms' disclosure practices.
Second, recent studies (e.g. Li et al 2013) develop a firm-level competi-
tion measure, based on how managers perceive the firm's competitive envi-
ronment in the management discussion and analysis section (MD&A) of 10-K
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filing for US public firms.6 Future research may use firm level competition
measures to provide in-depth insights on the association between competition
and corporate governance disclosure.
Finally, although competition at the industry level is considered stable
in the short to medium term, longitudinal studies may take the advantage of
studying external shocks to an industry, to explore how an increased or
decreased level of competition shapes firms' disclosure practice over time.
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ENDNOTES
1. Basil Al-Najjar; Department of Management; School of Business, Economics and
Informatics; Birkbeck, University of London Email: b.al-najjar@bbk.ac.uk; Rong Ding,
Accounting and Finance, Southampton University, Email: R.Ding@soton.ac.uk.
2. We employ a corporate governance rating score from the Corporate Governance
Quotient database developed by Institutional Shareholder Services, that rates publicly
traded companies in terms of the quality of their corporate governance. Each public
company is assigned a rating based on a number of factors including board structure
and composition, the executive and director compensation charter, and bylaw provi-
sions. The information is disclosed voluntarily by each firm, which reflects their level
of disclosure of internal governance information.
3. It is essential to note that firms from regulated industries (i.e., financial and utilities
firms) are excluded because they have different statutory requirements compared with
firms in other industries.
4.  Based on a large sample of US firms, Li (2010) uses principal component analysis
to construct competition from potential rivals with industry average of plant and
equipment, industry average R&D, industry average capital expenditure and industry
market size.
5. These results are available upon request.
6.Li et al (2013) use the number of occurrences of competition-related words (such as
competition, competitor, competitive and competing) per 1,000 total words in the 10-K
to capture competition at firm level, and find that firms' rates of diminishing marginal
return on new and existing investment vary significantly with this measure.
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